The re-professionalization of the police in England and Wales by Holdaway, S
The Re-Professionalisation of the Police in England and Wales 
Simon Holdaway, Professor of Criminology, Nottingham Trent University 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article contemporary police claims to professional status are analysed and 
related to a new structure of police regulation in England and Wales.  It is argued that 
the notion of the police as a profession is not new and, unlike police and academic 
commentary, analysis of this subject, should draw on sociological understandings of 
professions.  The wider policy context within which claims to professionalisation are 
made is also considered.  It is argued that a new, loosely-coupled system of 
regulation has been developed in England and Wales.  Policing’s professional body, 
the College of Policing, is central to this regulatory framework that has placed 
government at a distance from constabularies and police representative 
associations.  Finally, some of the consequences of the hybrid system are 
considered and benefits of the framework of analysis proposed are discussed. 
 
 
Introduction 
I suppose you could sum it all up by saying that in Britain 
certainly, and I have no doubt elsewhere, the time has come 
when the police are abandoning their artisan status and are 
achieving by our ever-increasing variety of services, our 
integrity, our accountability and our dedication to the public 
good, a status no less admirable than that of the most learned 
and distinguished professions (Mark, 1977). 
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The designation of the police as a profession is not a contemporary idea.  During a 
period when he dealt with serious corruption in his force Robert Mark, Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police, argued that the 1970’s was a decade of change from 
artisan to professional police status.  Mark’s assertion was by no means the first 
claim of professional standing for the police.1  In his history of English and Welsh 
constabularies, for example, Crtichley described changes to policing during the 
1960s as evidence of their professional standing and a return to fundamental, 
Peelian principles (Critchley, 1967: 267).  Most recently, in his 2011 report about 
police leadership and training, commissioned and accepted by the Home Secretary 
as the rationale for the establishment of a professional body for policing in England 
and Wales, former chief constable Peter Neyroud reiterated police claims to 
professionalism.  He put it that, ‘wide-ranging developments over the last two 
decades secure the police as a profession’ (Neyroud, 2011: 45).  The establishment 
of a professional body for the police of England and Wales in 2013 reflects long-
standing comment about and assertions that they are a profession.  Rather than 
engaged with novelty, the police of England and Wales are currently re-
professionalising their occupation.2   
 
‘Re-professionalisation’ refers to periodic, authoritative, public claims that the police 
are a profession.  Mark’s claim, first made in a 1973 televised lecture, challenged 
what he regarded as the uncontested corrupt, unethical behaviour of ‘professional’ 
1 Michael Banton points out that American police began to debate the idea of the police as a 
profession in the 1930s and in 1948, Sir John Moylan, past Receiver of the Metropolitan Police, 
argued that his force was a member of the professions. Banton M. (1964) The Policeman in the 
Community, London: Tavistock. 
2 It is interesting that no police officers have made this point when discussing professionalisation 
publicly.  Most seem to assume that the police are already a profession and then go on to talk about 
professionalising the service. 
2 
 
                                            
criminal lawyers who defended high profile criminals, contrasting it to the ethical 
practices of police officers (SirRobertMark.co.uk, 1973).  When he made this claim 
he was engaged in a somewhat successful anti-corruption drive within his own 
constabulary.  That is an indicator of how a profession acts.   
 
Later during the same decade, police claims to be a profession focussed more upon 
the educational qualifications and managerial prowess of senior officers and fast 
track, direct entrants to officer rank (Holdaway, 1977). These declarations coincided 
with increasing police collaboration with local and national agencies and an 
emphasis on skilled management practiced in the public sector.  As a profession, the 
police employed senior officers with similar qualifications and managerial skills. 
 
Peter Neyroud’s 2011 report, advocating the establishment of a professional body for 
the police of England and Wales, emphasised very different professional 
characteristics, which he traced from the 1980s.  He defines the police as a 
profession akin to medicine, the law and other bodies because they share their 
classical traits, a code of ethics, accredited qualifications, a foundation of systematic 
‘scientific’ research, and more. 
 
It is now clear that claims to professional status for the police emphasise existing or 
introduce at different times new occupational characteristics as evidence of 
professional standing.   The meaning of the police as a profession has changed over 
the years, something the extensive literature about the sociology of the professions 
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has long debated more generally (Cain, 1972: ; Evetts, 2011: ; Greenwood, 1957: ; 
Marshall, 1939: ; Wilensky, 1964).3  When the police describe their work routinely as 
professional in commonsense, everyday language they sustain it with a particular 
status.  The notion of ‘re-professionalisation’, however, captures a different, public 
declaration in which particular attributes of a profession are emphasised and related, 
implicitly or explicitly, to the social context within which they articulated.  ‘Re-
professionalisation’ and the contemporary context within which it is manifested are 
the main subjects of this paper.  It is argued that, amongst other matters, a lack of 
trust in police integrity and new government policies intended to distance ministers 
from the regulation of constabularies are key aspects of a renewed emphasis on the 
idea that the police are a profession.   
 
Academics commenting on the police as a profession have not investigated either 
the meaning of the idea or its social context.  They have not questioned police claims 
through engagement with the extensive sociological literature on the professions, 
seeming to prefer an implicit acceptance that the police might be and probably are a 
profession, demonstrating the traditional traits associated with such an institution.  .  
David Sklansky, Jenny Fleming, and Nick Tilley and Gloria Laycock, for example, in 
recent papers published in a collection to inform ‘The Commission on the Future of 
Policing’, considered the professional status of police in the UK and the USA 
(Fleming, 2014: ; Sklansky, 2014: ; Tilley and Laycock, 2014).  Their analyses do not 
consider definitions of a profession.  Neither do they consider why different meanings 
3 Bayley DH and Stenning PC. (2016) Governing the Police: Expereince in Six Democracies, London: 
Transaction Publishers., mention this in a short paragraph but do not analyse its different meanings 
or, indeed, analyse how professionalisation or any other recent changes are related to the 
contemporary governance of the police. 
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of the police as a profession have been fostered at different times; analyse them with 
reference to the sociology of the professions; or consider how social theory might 
illuminate their conclusions.  Further, professional claims are not located historically 
or related to wider social and, more particularly, policy change.  The notion of the 
police as a profession has found broad, uncritical acceptance within academe, 
government and the police.   
 
This paper begins from a distinct analytical standpoint, questioning the taken for 
granted status of the police as a profession.  Contemporary claims to professional 
status are probed to identify the contexts within which they are made; meanings 
ascribed to actions establishing the police as a profession are analysed; and the 
intended and unintended consequences of such meanings and related actions are 
scrutinized.  First, the policy context within which a renewed interest in the police as 
a profession has developed is discussed.  Next, the paper applies insights from the 
sociology of the professions to the re-professionalisation of the police, to understand 
professionalisation as processes that invoke particular, authoritative meanings.  The 
paper ends with consideration of re-professionalisation as a key aspect of a new 
structure of police governance and regulation in England and Wales.4  This loosely-
coupled system is then analysed, the police as a profession being a central to it.  As 
the article progresses, a distinct theoretical perspective on police regulation and its 
study will be charted.   
 
4 Definitions of regulation are many and varied.  In this paper I draw on Scott’s definition, ‘A set of 
processes by which norms are established, the behaviour of those subject to the norms monitored or 
fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the behaviour of regulated 
actors within the acceptable limits of the regime Scott C. (2001) Analysing regulatory space: 
fragmented resources and institutional design. Public Law Summer: 329-353. p.3. 
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The contemporary developments in police policy analysed here replace a relatively 
harmonious, institutional structure of police regulation in which the Home Office set 
or, more recently, agreed constabulary annual plans, articulated Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary’s (HMIC) work and were virtually dependent on ACPO 
for setting many standards of police practice.  Although occasional tensions within 
and between these actors were evident, formal relationships cohered around a clear, 
government-led system of police regulation and accountability.  The argument here is 
that the Home Office centred organisation of police regulation has been reformed, 
replaced by a loosely-coupled system in which the notion of a professional police is 
vital (Weick, 1976). 
 
Some reforms discussed have distanced central government from local police policy 
and accountability, suggesting a strategy of ‘steering not rowing’ (Rhodes, 2000).  
Importantly, changes related to the emergence of these conditions have drawn on 
third party, ‘independent’ recommendations for reform, to some extent distancing 
further the government from responsibility for both national and local police policies.  
Accompanying these reforms, significant, direct intervention in the constabularies of 
England and Wales has also been re-calibrated through the work of HMIC and the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).  These conditions suggest a 
hybrid, fragmented form of regulatory governance of the police in England and Wales 
articulated significantly but not exclusively through processes of professionalisation.   
 
The contemporary context of police professsionalisation 
The Neyroud Review 
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Neyroud’s 2011 review of police leadership and training was commissioned in 2010, 
very soon after the election of a Conservative government (now in its second term) 
and is the contemporary reference point for understanding the re-professionalisation 
of the police in England and Wales.  His terms of reference indicate that the 
Conservative party had been considering radical reforms, including the creation of a 
professional body and associated policies, during their years in opposition (Neyroud, 
2011: 9).   
 
As far as Neyroud was concerned, the immediate problem faced by both police and 
government was ambiguity about the body responsible and accountable for setting 
policing standards.  Chief constables have operational autonomy within their 
constabularies but ACPO, their former representative body, had for more than two 
decades published national guidance to their members.  Neither ACPO’s proposals 
for setting policing standards nor their decision-making processes were transparent 
or accountable publicly (Neyroud, 2011: 66-7).  This situation proved difficult for the 
former National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) with its brief to identify and 
disseminate guidance about best police policy and practice.5  The Home Secretary 
wanted clear advice rather than a welter of sometimes discordant information about 
diverse subjects provided by ACPO and other bodies (Neyroud, 2011: 64). 6 
 
5 Neyroud was the Head of the NPIA before he retired from the police service and therefore acutely 
aware of this matter. 
6 ACPO alone had over 200 working groups and sub-groups within what it called ‘13 business areas).  
In addition, the NPIA, The Association of Police Authorities, The Police Federation and the 
Superintendents Association, amongst others, also had working groups and other forums to inform 
policy and practice. 
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A new, professional body for policing, Neyroud argued, would provide a single 
source for the definition and dissemination of national police standards, foster greater 
external scrutiny of proposals for standards, and a great deal more.  Its governing 
body, including ‘lay members’ and a chair from outside policing, would provide 
oversight to enhance public accountability of the professional body’s work.  
Importantly, the ability of other groups that previously developed advice about police 
standards, the Police Superintendent’s Association and the Police Federation, for 
example, would be removed.  When established in 2012, The College of Policing 
was to be the body that ‘defined and disseminated core knowledge about ‘what 
works in policing’, national policing standards, professional practice and local best 
practice (Neyroud, 2011: 93-4). 
 
Police ethics and integrity 
The College of Policing’s initial work included the publication of a code of ethics for 
policing.  Professional bodies typically publish codes of ethics for their membership 
and it was no doubt important symbolically for the College to act similarly.  Other 
matters, external to the Home Office and College, however, were also of significance 
to the initial focus upon ethics as a foundation of professionalisation.  Highly 
publicised incidents questioning police integrity received considerable media and 
government attention, including cases involving chief officers.  The Hillsborough 
case, for example, saw the integrity of Sir Norman Bettinson, Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire Police, called into question.  It was alleged that, when working in 
South Yorkshire Police, Bettinson had overseen the drafting of sanitised statements 
about the death of 96 and injury to 766 fans at a football match and required officers 
to sign them.  Bettinson retired from his force after considerable public and media 
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pressure (Wright, 2015).  The manner in which South Yorkshire Police, not least its 
chief officers, dealt with and investigated the deaths became the subject of a highly 
critical, independent inquiry and, separately, a formal investigation by the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (Hillsborough, 2012).  An inquest 
following the independent inquiry returned a verdict that the 96 fans had been killed 
unlawfully. 
 
Hillsborough is just one case that brought questions about the reliability of police 
integrity into public view.  The 1993 Stephen Lawrence murder investigation, etched 
deeply into the contemporary history of troubled police race relations in England and 
Wales, drew lasting media and public attention (Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, 
1999).  Other, significant but less high profile cases involving, for example, the chief 
and deputy chief constables of Cleveland Police, who in 2012 were dismissed from 
office for gross misconduct, added to government concern (Independent, 2012a: ; 
Independent, 2013).  In North Yorkshire, the chief constable faced disciplinary 
charges related to nepotism when recruiting staff.  His deputy was implicated in the 
offences and retired (Independent, 2012b).  The integrity and managerial 
competence of chief officers, including the ability of ACPO to foster acceptable 
ethical standards amongst its membership, was brought to the attention of the 
government by these and other cases.  A code of police ethics written and regulated 
by a professional police body might influence and better control chief officers’ 
decision-making. 
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As far as the lower ranks were concerned, the 2012 ‘Plebgate’ case involving 
allegations of a fracas between constables on duty outside the prime minister’s 
residence and a Cabinet Minister whom, it was alleged, had sworn at them 
(Independent, 2014), implicated constables and their representative association, the 
Police Federation, in allegations of illegal and unethical behaviour made by a cabinet 
minister and other members of parliament.  The House of Commons, Home Affairs 
Select Committee added their criticisms after questioning Police Federation officials 
about their action in response to the alleged incident.  Questions about public trust in 
the police tracked Plebgate for several months, drawing attention to the lower police 
ranks and their representative body, indicating the need for a code of police ethics 
and a professional body for policing. 
 
Complaints against the police 
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), with its mandate to 
investigate serious public complaints against police officers, has an impact on 
unethical police conduct but, inevitably, after the event.7  Investigation and, possibly, 
disciplinary action follow a complaint, implying an officer’s behaviour should change.  
A more basic and pervasive measure to prevent misconduct before it occurred was 
also required and a code of ethics was seen as central to this.  Substantial extra 
funds to restructure and strengthen the IPCC’s work were provided by the 
government in 2014 (House of Commons, 18th Dec. 2013).  A code of professional 
ethics and increased IPCC funding were aspects of a wider project to strengthen the 
re-professionalisation and regulate police behaviour more effectively.  
7 The Policing and Crime Bill 2015-16 includes wide-ranging provisions for the revision of the IPCC.  
They will not, however, have an impact on the points made above. 
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 Localism 
The Tory government has placed a many stranded policy of ‘localism’ at the centre of 
its legislative programme.8  In this vein, their Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) 
policy replaced what they viewed as unelected and unaccountable police authorities 
with locally-elected Police and Crime Commissioners for every constabulary area.  
Consultation with local people to determine policing priorities is central to a PCC’s 
work.  A PCC appoints the chief constable, removing the screening of candidates by 
a joint committee of ACPO, The Home Office, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and an ‘independent’ member who most recently was a retired chief 
constable.  ACPO’s influence on chief constable appointments was removed.  Even 
more important is a Commissioner’s key work to ensure the chief constable is 
accountable, delivering their Police Plan based on local citizens’ priorities.  An 
intended effect of elected PCCs has been to introduce a new local rather than central 
government dimension to police accountability.   
 
Teresa May, the Home Secretary who introduced Police and Crime Commissioners, 
was careful to ensure that the new, local arrangements for police accountability were 
not dominated by central government.  Early in her term of office she told the 2010 
Police Federation conference that she was offering the service ‘a deal’, the essence 
of which was ‘more freedom to the police professionals; more power to the people’ 
8 The notion of ‘localism’ is not entirely new and this is not the first time it has been of relevance to 
police policy (McLaughlin E. (2005) Forcing the Issue: New Labour, New Localism and the Democratic 
Renewal of Police Accountability. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 44(5): 473-489..  The 
change noted is the strengthening of localism within policing, not least by the government’s Police and 
Crime Commissioner policy. 
11 
 
                                            
(The Home Office, 2010).  Emphasising the idea of officers as members of a 
profession, her speech stressed that, respectively, chief constables would manage 
constabularies and locally-based PCCs make them accountable.  Freedom from 
government intervention, as May saw it the opposite of the previous government’s 
police policies, would allow professionals to work to high standards that include their 
acceptance of the local population setting policing priorities and rendering them 
accountable through an elected official, the Police and Crime Commissioner, he or 
she being free from party political interference or bias.  The implication was that the 
Home Secretary works at a distance from local constabularies.  She placed the 
legislation to establish PCCs before parliament and supported in various ways the 
idea of police officers as members of a profession.  That done, local commissioners, 
with their regulatory powers and other resources, were positioned in the ascendency, 
free from central government regulation. 
 
Public sector budget cuts 
More than any other feature, stringent cuts to the public sector budget were 
introduced by The Treasury in 2010 and have remained central to Tory economic 
policy.  To this extent central government has intervened directly in the reform of 
policing. 
 
In October 2010, central funding for the police service was reduced by 20% during 
the four years between March 2011 and March 2015 (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, 2013).  This approach was distinct, separating it from the Thatcher 
government that also made cuts to public expenditure during the 1980s but placed a 
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protective ring-fence around the police.9  Clearly, local police budgets have come 
under pressure and PCCs, who in addition to other responsibilities have a duty to set 
their constabulary budget, and chief constables, who manage expenditure, have had 
to make some difficult decisions about the allocation of funds. 
 
80% of the police budget is spent on staff salaries and, following the announcement 
of budgetary cuts, significant changes to pay and conditions were revealed.  
Certainly, Teresa May, as Home Secretary, did not run away from taking 
responsibility for new, lower police salaries and pensions.  Her action to change 
them, however, was not based on an internal, civil service analysis of existing 
policies or her own party’s preferences.  Rather, an independent review by Tom 
Winsor, erstwhile railway regulator, set out wide-ranging proposals for the reform of 
police pay and conditions that were accepted and implemented fully by the Home 
Secretary (Winsor, 2011). 
 
It is important to note that whilst changes to police pay and conditions have been 
implemented directly by the Home Office, their justification for reform was based on 
an independent analysis by Tom Winsor, who worked at a distance from 
government.  There were no doubt discussions between Winsor, ACPO and the 
Police Federation, the rank-and-file representative body, but he did not enter formal 
negotiations with them, neither did the Home Secretary when implementing his 
recommendations.  The police were distanced from decision-making about their new 
terms and conditions and, importantly, an independent person, not the Home 
9  In the Autumn Statement, 2015, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the police budget 
would be protected from further cuts in the immediate future. 
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Secretary or the civil service, recommended them to the government.  Again, we 
note the regulation of significant changes to police budgets initiated at a distance 
from central government. 
 
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
In 2012, the Home Secretary appointed Tom Winsor as Her Majesty’s Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary, the first civilian to be appointed to the post.  Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is one of the most important police regulatory 
bodies, inspecting and advising constabularies.  Its reports provide constabularies, 
individually and collectively, with instructions about policies and practices found 
wanting and in need of change within a stated period.   With Winsor at the helm and 
five Inspectors in post, three who are also civilians, the potential influence of chief 
constables on the Inspectorate has been challenged and weakened.  Until 2009 all 
inspectors were former chief constables.  There are now more civilian than police 
inspectors.   
 
These changes are aspects of the Home Secretary’s commitment to create a more 
independent HMIC (Home Office, 2010).  Indeed, Winsor secured extra funding for 
the Inspectorate, top sliced from forces’ financial allocations (HMIC, 2014), and 
increased the number of inspections of constabularies to six monthly intervals.  Plans 
for national, thematic inspections have been opened to public consultation.  The 
police are just one consultee amongst many.  Although it might seem insignificant to 
an untrained eye, Winsor has worn police uniform at public occasions, symbolising 
his view that the recruitment of people from non-police posts to senior rank is 
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acceptable.  The wider framework of police governance includes ‘civilians’ not just 
chief constables.  HMIC has been distanced further from Home Office and 
constabulary influence. 
 
The College of Policing 
The College of Policing is the professional body for policing and a major feature of 
the new police landscape.  It has five objectives, including, ‘Identifying, developing 
and promoting ethics, values and standards of integrity’, ‘identifying, promoting and 
supporting practice based on evidence’ and ‘setting standards of professional 
practice’ (College of Policing, 2014).  More than this, the College has the ambition for 
the public to be confident that, ‘police officers adhere to a national code of 
professional policing practice and receive professional development throughout their 
careers’ (College of Policing, 2015b). 
 
A Board of Governors oversees these far reaching objectives and promulgates 
policies for all areas of police work.  The Board is chaired by a former university Vice-
Chancellor, with more ‘lay’ than police members.  A Professional Committee with a 
membership mostly of chief constables deals with questions about the 
implementation of policies proposed by the Board.  The intention is that the 
professional committee does not make decisions about appropriate policy but 
comments on its implementation, no more.  It is of course possible and, indeed, may 
be usual for policy to be changed as it is implemented in constabularies (Holdaway, 
1979).  In formal terms, however, accountability for appropriate policy implementation 
lies nationally with HMIC and locally with each PCC.  The authorisation of policies for 
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the wide range of areas for which the College of Policing has responsibility lies with 
its governing body. 
 
The College of Policing, unlike the erstwhile ACPO, NPIA or any other police 
representative association, is central to the Home Secretary’s programme of change 
for constabularies.10  Constitutionally, it has responsibility for defining a very wide-
range of police standards of work and placed at a distance from government as a 
near autonomous professional body.  Once more we find a key actor in the new 
landscape of policing, a professional body for the police, the College of Policing, 
distant from the Home Office but undertaking regulatory work of direct relevance to it. 
 
The police as a profession 
The status of the police as a profession is integral to the framework of regulation 
created by the changes outlined.  Indeed, at its 2015 annual conference, the College 
of Policing’s chief executive, Alex Marshall, stated that work completed to establish a 
body of knowledge about ‘what works’ in policing, the publication of a code of ethics 
for the police, a programme of continuous professional development and the 
licensing and accreditation of officers have secured the police as a classic profession 
(College of Policing, 2015a). 
 
10  The National Chief Constables Council has replaced ACPO.  It has established many committees   
covering numerous aspects of police work which reflect ACPO’s structure.  A chief constable takes 
the lead for each area of ‘business’, so called.  The extent to which the Council will revert to working 
like ACPO is a moot point.  Its objectives, however, are clear, concerned with implementing College of 
Policing standards and policies.  In all areas of work it will work with the College. 
16 
 
                                            
The Sociology of Professionalisation 
Marshall’s view chimes clearly with a longstanding sociological approach to the 
professions based on the definition of characteristics that separate them from 
occupations (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: ; Greenwood, 1957).  Professions 
have a professional body; a code of ethics; evidence based practice; accredited 
employment, for example.  This was also the approach accepted by Neyroud, who 
identified these traits as synonymous with those of the classic professions, law and 
medicine being two.  Definitions of professions were not considered by the academic 
commentators discussed earlier but it appears they accepted the common-sense 
‘trait perspective’ uncritically (Neyroud, 2012, Fleming, 2014, Tilley and Laycock, 
2014).   
 
Criticisms of the trait approach to professions are well established, not the least of 
which has been the creation and revision of increasingly long lists of traits, their 
importance sometimes weighted, to include and exclude occupations (Millerson, 
1964).  The title of Wilensky’s influential paper, ‘The Professionalisation of Everyone’, 
captured the essence of this criticism (Wilensky, 1964).  My main reservation about 
this analytical approach, however, is that it is static.  When compared to a list of 
professional traits, an occupation either is or is not defined as a profession.  The 
wider social context within which entitlements to professional status are developed is 
not considered; processes of claims-making are neither described nor analysed; and 
the meanings of claims of professional standing, some with implicit or explicit 
regulatory effects, are not taken into account.   
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The meanings and effects of claims to professional status, however, are central to 
Johnson’s analysis of professionalisation as a process of constructing an ideology to 
enhance the authority and power of an occupation (Johnson, 1972).  Johnson argued 
that self-serving interests of authority and power are central to professional status.  
His analysis challenged Freidson, who argued that professionals’ commitment to an 
ethic of service was consistent with disinterested self-regulation (Freidson, 2001).  
Johnson’s understanding of professions is helpful to an analysis of police 
professionalisation in the contemporary context described.  He directs our attention 
to forms of authority sought when claims to professionalisation are made in particular 
contexts.   
 
There is, however, an important feature of the present context of police 
professionalisation that is in tension with Johnson’s analysis.  Authority to regulate 
membership of the police profession and other powers has certainly been given to 
the College of Policing.  Authority and greater, related powers to check and, if needs 
be, override decisions based exclusively on the authority of police officers as 
professionals have nevertheless also been given to the College’s lay-dominated 
governing council, HMIC, with its majority of ‘lay inspectors’, and the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission.  This suggests countervailing opportunities for the 
police to make claims to self-regulation through professionalisation and a moderation 
of Johnson’s argument.  Johnson’s approach to professionalisation does not account 
adequately for these key features of the current re-professionalisation of the police in 
England and Wales. 
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Basing her argument on Foucault’s notion of the power of rhetoric, Fournier has 
argued that ‘the disciplinary logic of professionalism’ creates the identity of the 
professional and prompts actions related directly to it (Fournier, 1999).  Defined 
police competencies required for membership of the professional College of Policing, 
for example, create officers who regard themselves as professionals and act 
professionally.  Again, this perspective has the advantage of directing attention to the 
ways in which professional status is claimed and practices related to it cloaked with 
authority.  Fournier argues that such claims are fragile and need to be asserted 
frequently.  In this sense, Fournier embraces the notion of re-professionalisation but 
her fundamental argument proposes the over-determination of identity and related 
actions that create a professional.  We know from research that police identity is not 
uniform.  We also know that a distinction should be made between senior and junior 
police ranks’ ideas about policy and practice and that written policy does not 
translate into practice straightforwardly (Gundhus, 2012: ; Holdaway, 1983: ; Loftus, 
2009). 
 
Julia Evetts has analysed changing processes of professionalisation or, as she calls 
it, ‘professionalism’ (Evetts, 2003).  In harmony with Becker’s and Hughes’s 
perspective of symbolic interactionism (Becker, 1970: ; Hughes, 1958: ; Hughes, 
1994), she argues that professionalism is most adequately understood as symbolic 
processes during which claims for status and authority about occupational values are 
made by advocates.  ‘Professionalism’, however, is not a wholly symbolic 
construction.  Instrumental changes to action and to the structure of organisations 
are also fundamental to it.  Evetts provides an argument avoiding the crudity of the 
trait perspective, Johnson’s overreach when conceptualising the authority and power 
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allowing professionals to regulate themselves, and problems of over-determination 
presented by Fournier. 
 
Interestingly, Evetts makes a distinction between assertions for ‘professionalism from 
below’ and ‘professionalism from above’ (Evetts, 2011).  The former refers to 
practitioners’ claims about their status and authority, more usually concerned with 
autonomy and aspects of self-regulation.  The gains from ‘professionalism from 
above’, initiated by senior managerial staff and government, are different, more 
concerned with standardisation, bureaucracy, assessment, the codification of ethics, 
continuing education related to a body of professional knowledge, collegial authority, 
a strong sense of purpose and, crucially, regulation (Muzio and Kirkpatrick, 2011).  
These are features of police professionalism within the hybrid system of police 
regulation now established in England and Wales.  
 
Understanding the (re) professionalisation of the police and regulation 
The evidence presented so far suggests that a loosely-coupled structure (Weick, 
1976) including a number of new actors has replaced a closely-coupled framework of 
police regulation in which the government was the central actor.  Loose coupling 
serves as a sensitizing notion that directs research attention away from, ‘rationalized, 
tidy, efficient, coordinated structures…..to some of the attractive and unexpected 
properties of less rationalized and less tightly related clusters of events (Weick, 1976: 
3).  The implication is that it is necessary to describe and analyse a web of 
relationships constructed by events – acts of regulation – that both bring together 
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and separate organisations with regulatory authority.  As Weick put it, ‘coupled 
events are responsive, but each event also preserves its own identity and some 
evidence of its physical or logical separateness’ (Weick, 1976: 3).  One important 
implication of this perspective for research draws attention to the description and 
analysis of when, how and what is done by a regulatory actor using their regulatory 
authority symbolically or instrumentally.  It also begs analysis of relationships 
between actions by one or more actors.  They might harmonize or conflict to some 
extent; they might be discrete.  From this perspective it would be inadvisable to 
understand regulatory actions as if they are irregular, deviations within a more tightly 
bound system  To return to Weick, regulatory activity and systems are not best 
conceptualised as, ‘rationalized, tidy, efficient, coordinated’ (Weick, 1976: 3).   
 
In the new framework for police regulation, authority is given to existing and new 
organisations, HMIC, the IPCC, PCCs and the College of Policing, for example.  
Each actor is at a distance from government and the Home Office.  Each has a 
formal regulatory objective for distinct areas of policing.  PCCs, for example, ensure 
chief constables implement public priorities for local policing in policy and practice 
and render chief constables accountable for the management of the force budget.  
As a professional body, the College of Policing has a duty to establish a corpus of 
knowledge about what works in policing and ensure that the accreditation of its 
members includes education about and assessment of their understanding of it.  
Further, the College has an obligation to ensure that its Code of Ethics pervades 
police practice, which assumes a regulatory role through the work of chief constables 
and, indeed, all supervisory officers.  HMIC and the IPCC have their own, enhanced 
areas of regulatory responsibility.  Some responsibilities may overlap and be unclear; 
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contradictions of who has responsibility for regulating particular areas of policing may 
be apparent.  This, however, does not mean that research should assume loosely 
coupled regulatory actions are deviations from an ideal of formal rationality that is 
essential to the notion of a system. 
 
When a PCC questions a chief constable about force performance and requires 
specific actions to improve policy and or practice, regulatory work very similar to that 
undertaken by HMIC during an inspection is apparent.  As Weick reminds us, each 
action nevertheless retains its own identity and is distinct.  Each intervention is 
understood appropriately as the contribution of a single actor within a ‘loosely-
coupled system’ in which other actors might or might not respond.11  Similarly, when 
the College of Policing sets strategy for an area of policing it is undertaking work that 
is loosely-coupled to that of a PCC establishing local strategy, based on the views of 
a constabulary’s population. The PCC may give a priority to public rather than 
‘professional’ views expressed by the College.  There will also be times when a PCC 
follows ‘what works’ and implements advice from the College.  In both cases HMIC 
can inspect and give mandatory, remedial advice to constabularies that do not 
implement what-works guidance in policy and practice.  
 
As the professional body, the College of Policing is an important actor in this 
regulatory system.  At times the College’s professional standing and advice will place 
them in the ascendency; at other times similar events will not ensure their authority.  
Crucially, their claim to professional standing and to the police as members of a 
11   This is an important difference from mainstream systems analyses.  The parts of the system are 
not adapted deterministically. 
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profession affords them status and, more importantly, a regulatory function within the 
system now created in England and Wales.  Professional status does not guarantee 
authority and power, however.  There will be times, for example, when the College of 
Policing and PCCs take a different view of public priorities and best practice for a 
constabulary. HMIC might challenge the professional competence of a chief 
constable and the adequacy of a PCC’s regulation of him or her.  A straightforward 
rebuttal by the College or a chief officer, arguing that their professional standing and 
competence is sufficient to justify their action, would be inadequate.  As Evetts 
(2003) points out, a profession is best understood as constituted by a dynamic 
process, with claims made to sustain its security as it vies with and yields to the 
regulatory claims of other actors. 
 
Marianna Valverde’s work on ‘security’ is pertinent to this point, reminding us that the 
notions of ‘a profession’, ‘professional’, ‘regulation’ and, implicitly, ‘system’ are 
vibrant (Valverde, 2011: ; Valverde, 2012).  She points out that ‘security’ is not a 
normative notion and, following William James’s understanding of religion, ‘all that 
we can know about security is what people do in its name and, therefore, our focus 
should be on practices of governance that appeal to “security” (Valverde, 2011: : 5)’.  
So it is with the notion of a profession and of regulation.  To understand the ways in 
which the idea of the police as a profession and of claims made on its basis requires 
the analysis of moments when declarations of professionalism are made and 
regulatory tasks are undertaken on the basis of its authoritative foundations.  This 
approach reveals the flux and flow of professional and regulatory processes related 
to the College and, of course, each of the other actors working within the hybrid 
system described.  In particular, and following Valverde’s argument, the logic, 
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rationale and objectives of professional, regulatory projects; their scope, both 
temporal and spatial; their claimed jurisdiction to regulate action; and the techniques 
to translate professional discourses into everyday policing actions, especially through 
management practices, should be incorporated into analyses of the professionalism 
of policing.   
 
Valverde also prompts us to consider how her own and Weick’s ideas are of 
relevance to the socio-legal literature about regulation, where one finds notions of 
‘plural regulation’ and ‘de-centred regulation’ (Black, 2001: ; Black, 2002a: ; Black, 
2002b: ; Parker, 2008).  These approaches consider to different extents how 
regulatory functions have involved, ‘a shift (and recognition of such a shift) in the 
locus of the activity of “regulating” from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the 
adoption on the part of the state of particular strategies of regulation’ (Black, 2001: 
112).  The problem, as Ayres and Braithwaite put it, is now one of enforced 
regulation beyond state organisations and how to regulate the regulators (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992).   
 
With Valverde’s work in mind, important differences between many approaches to 
regulation found in the socio-legal literature and that suggested by the argument 
presented here are apparent.  First, much of the relevant literature is concerned with 
considering possible, effective reforms to regulatory structures suited to new legal 
and quasi-legal conditions (for example, Braithwaite, 2002, 2013).  The approach 
proposed here, however, is not about required reform of police regulatory structures.  
It is largely about the development of an analytical perspective to probe the 
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contemporary regulation of the police in England and Wales.  Secondly, law is 
frequently given considerable weight as a solution to problems of plural and other 
diverse forms of regulation.  Considering regulation in multi-cultural societies, 
Christine Parker, for example, seeks to define ‘the conceptual tools to identify a type 
of emergent, pluralistic law, without or beyond the state…’ (Parker, 2008).  This 
ambition is too narrow to consider the wider regulation of law, rules, actions and, as 
far as police ethics and professionalisation are concerned, sentiments and attitudes.  
Thirdly, actors within the current police, loosely coupled system of regulation are to 
some extent autonomous but nevertheless closer to the state than those working 
within the wide body of organisations considered by analysts of plural and de-centred 
regulatory bodies.   
 
One relevant insight from the socio-legal literature, however, is the notion of a 
‘regulatory space’, developed by Colin Scott and used metaphorically to analyse 
different resources available to actors who, ‘draw our attention to the need to 
conceive of strategies of regulation as consisting of a wide range of negotiated 
processes, of which rule formation and enforcement are but two (Scott, 2001: p.1)’.  
Different actors use resources - finance, the ability to shame publicly, information, 
authority to warn, and to punish, for example - differently at different times.  
Regulators and regulatees, however, are not restricted to state actors within Scott’s 
argument, which again tends to focus his discussion upon a much wider range of 
regulators than those within contemporary police arrangements. 
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Scott’s approach is nevertheless helpful because it identifies the wide range of 
regulatory resources available to a regulator and argues that regulation is not to be 
understood as a formally rational, hierarchical system.  Rather, it is to be 
conceptualised as ‘complex, dynamic and horizontal’ processes that requires an 
understanding of the limits of law in regulation and the dispersal of authority to act as 
a regulator’ (Scott, 2001:1).  Scott goes on to give attention to problems of 
institutional design that are raised by this situation and to the regulation of the 
financial sector.  They are not the concern of this article but the way in which Scott 
frames research about regulation is certainly of relevance. 
  
Discussion 
The analytical approach outlined so far has considerable implications for research.  
Meanings of the police as a profession and of related regulatory organisations are 
placed within their policy and wider social contexts; opportunities to describe and 
analyse relationships between those meanings and actions become possible.  The 
parsing of claims and counter-claims made by actors can be analysed.  Disputes 
about which actor has authority to regulate particular aspects of policing reveal the 
flux and flow of regulatory jurisdictions, techniques and claims based on professional 
and other competences.  The social topography of what might seem like a discrete 
set of regulatory organisations can be charted.  These features distinguish the 
approach advocated from existing criminological accounts of the police as a 
profession.  
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The notion of a loosely-coupled system sensitises us to these and related data about 
professionalism and regulation.  It abandons the notion of an implicit, formally 
rational structure lying behind apparent fragmentation.  Research about regulatory 
systems is not adequate if it compares loosely-coupled structures to an implied ideal, 
normative, closely coupled system.  Each organisation within a loosely-coupled 
regulatory system has formal purposes and functions.  People working within them 
act discretely and, to different extents, in relationship with colleagues and with 
employees in associated organisations (Bittner, 1967).  Regulatory systems are 
constructed and sustained continually by their action.  The apparent fragmentation of 
loosely-coupled systems does not mean that they are inherently unstable, wholly 
unpredictable or dysfunctional.  Valverde’s understanding of security, Evett’s notion 
of professionalism and Weick’s consideration of loose-coupling help us to keep in 
mind that, as quoted earlier, ‘coupled events are responsive, but each event also 
preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness’ 
(Weick, 1976: 3). 
 
The contemporary notion of police professionalism analysed suggests that the 
longstanding argument that written policy and law are to be distinguished from law 
and policy in action  is pertinent to understanding the police as a profession (Pound, 
1910).  To compare characteristics of the police in England and Wales to a list of 
professional traits could be an indicative starting point for research but the sociology 
of the professions warns convincingly that the analytic strength of the trait approach 
is weak.  Importantly, Johnson’s argument that professional status masks an 
ideology of freedom for professional bodies to regulate autonomously with greater 
authority and power draws our attention to the relationship between professionals 
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and regulation.  It needs considerable tempering in the current context of policing, 
however.  Checks and balances to autonomous regulation by police professionals 
have been identified.   
 
There will be times when police make authoritative judgements on the basis of their 
authority as professionals.  An implication of the theoretical argument presented 
implies, however, that professionalism is accomplished rather than a realist, 
descriptive category.  Research needs to give attention to strategies and tactics 
police use to promote it as a taken-for-granted phenomenon.  The ways in which it is 
framed - promoted, expressed, communicated, acted-out and parsed through 
discourse, performances and symbolic action - can be described and analysed 
(Brubaker et al., 2004). 
 
The foundations of ambitious research about professionalism and regulation within a 
loosely-coupled system have been set out.  Some caution about the efficacy of ‘loose 
structure’ as a key concept should nevertheless be expressed.  A point, made by 
Weick himself, is the need to demonstrate precisely how loose parts of a regulatory 
system relate to each other, the consequences of their relationships, and the 
contexts within which the parts are more or less aligned.  Without that stipulation any 
assemblage of structure can be conceptualised as ‘loosely-coupled’ and become an 
analytical catch-all rather than a sensitising concept drawing attention to 
relationships and meanings. 
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The final point is obvious but one too often absent from contemporary research about 
the police: the social world does not describe itself through the re-presentation of 
qualitative or quantitative research data (Atkinson, 2015).  This is why a central 
feature of the analysis presented draws on theoretical work about professions and 
about regulation.  A theoretical architecture of structure determining social life has no 
place within it.  The central concern is the (often small) ideas and related actions that 
construct and sustain a regulatory system, and the notion of the police as a 
profession.   
 
Conclusion 
Police claims to professional status are recurring, not new.  It has been established 
that, once situated within their social context and viewed through a theoretical lens, 
the re-professionalisation of the police is understood as a central facet of a new, 
hybrid, loosely-coupled system of police regulation.   
 
The current professionalisation of the police is a key feature of wider changes 
distancing the Home Office from the regulation of constabularies.  The College of 
Policing, the police professional body, has central regulatory functions developed 
alongside other important changes in the organisation of police regulation.   
 
The notion of loose-coupling sensitises us to a novel research perspective on police 
regulation in England and Wales.  Drawing on appropriate theoretical arguments, it 
becomes possible to document empirically how and within which contexts the 
29 
 
regulatory functions of each agency vie with and yield to each other.  Authoritative 
claims to an area of jurisdiction and related actions that may cut across the work of 
other regulatory agencies can be examined.  A new, dynamic landscape of police 
regulation affording a central place to professionalism can be described and 
analysed. 
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